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I INTRODUCTION
Justice Laurie Ackermann has played a pivotal role in the development of
the dignity jurisprudence of South Africa. At the heart of Ackermann’s
journey is nothing less than bravery exhibited by a constant struggle with
the development of a dignity jurisprudence worthy of a constitution that
does not simply forsake its moral grounding in ideals and values but insists
that enumerated rights must always be defended alongside the aspiration
to live up to those ideals and values. In a certain sense, then, the
Constitution1 is both law and an ethical call for its citizens to live up to
the aspirational ideals listed in s 1 of the founding provisions of the
Constitution. As Ackermann writes, there can be no final Constitution
because it will be up to the people of South Africa continually to
transform this country as guided by the great ideas of dignity, equality and
justice:
[T]he ultimate fate of the Constitution, a bridge with a very long span, will
not be decided by the jurisprudence of its courts alone, however devoted and
inspired that may prove to be. A transforming Constitution such as ours will
only succeed if everyone, in government as well as in civil society at all levels,
embraces and lives out its vales and its demands. It will only succeed if
restitutional equality becomes a reality and basic material needs are met,
because it borders on the obscene to preach human dignity to the homeless
and the starving. This must, however, be achieved in a manner consonant
with the human dignity of all. We are, after 10 years, only at the end of the
beginning.2
Ackermann takes us on a journey in which his elaboration of the dignity
jurisprudence becomes steadily more connected to the philosophy of
* Based on a keynote address delivered at the Law, Dignity and Transformative
Constitutionalism Conference, University of Cape Town, 26 and 27 July 2007.
† South African Research Chair in Customary Law, Indigenous Values and Dignity
Jurisprudence, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town.
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Unless otherwise indicated all
references to ‘the Constitution’ are to the 1996 Constitution.
2 L W H Ackermann, ‘The legal nature of the South African constitutional revolution’
(2004) 4 New Zealand Law Review 633 at 678–79.
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Immanuel Kant, which eventually leads him to revise and clarify some of
his earlier formulations on the meaning and significance of dignity.
II FREEDOM, DIGNITYAND THE RECHTSSTAAT OF
REVOLUTION
Two points need to be made before continuing. First, no constitution for
the robust, vibrant, dynamic cultural communities in South Africa with
their own laws and ethical definitions of being human, such as, for
instance, ubuntu, could or should be rooted strictly in the writings of
a western philosopher. But, since the notion of a Rechtsstaat is so
profoundly misunderstood in Anglo-American jurisprudence, we can at
least echo Ackermann’s own references to Kant in his constitutional
decisions to help us understand a non-positivist conception of Right – by
which I mean a conception of right as the realm of external freedom,
which, at least for Kant, is understood as a subdivision of the ‘moral’.3 But
we need to regard the term ‘moral’ with some intellectual suspicion,
because the German word Sitten actually appeals to a larger ethical
activity of justice, toward the aspirational ideal of a free humanity that can
harmonise competing interests not simply through balancing but through
an appeal to ideals and values that attribute ethical meaning to human life.
All of the most controversial issues that arise in debates about South
African jurisprudence, from the question of the justification for the
plenary jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to the significance of the
horizontality of the South African Constitution, ultimately take us back
not only to the question of what kind of revolution took place in the
1990s but also to why dignity – as it is integrally connected to freedom
(both as individual and communal self-legislation) – lies at the heart of
that reconstituted legal system.
Second, we must underscore that Justice Ackermann, although
certainly not alone, has proceeded through an understanding of the new
South Africa as a Rechtsstaat that embodies an objective realm of external
freedom irreducible to the coordination of subjective interests or even of
the legally inscribed protection of individuals against the state. Once we
understand this aspect of the new South Africa, we will be able to
understand the significance of the contention that there was indeed a
revolution in South Africa – not a peaceful transition. It was a revolution
that grew out of a relentless and courageous struggle for the freedom of
the black population, which included as a last resort the organisation of
the armed struggle under Nelson Mandela.
3 See I Kant ‘The metaphysics of morals’ in I Kant Cambridge Edition of the Writings of
Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy translated and edited by M J Gregor & general introduction
by A W Wood (1996) 353 at 365.
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Why is this legally important and not just historically important? As
Ackermann tells us, the revolution in South Africa was not a full
Kelsenian revolution in that it did not simply end all of the reigning
institutions of the previous judicial order.4 Ackermann, in his own words,
writes that, ‘there is no discontinuous legal fracture with the old legal
order. The revolution was commenced by a parliamentary statute of that
old order (namely, the [interim Constitution]) and controlled by it, and
the Constitutional Court was created by it’.5 It was a revolution,
however, in that law and indeed the principle of legality itself comes to be
grounded in the Constitution. The Constitution is the grounding source
of legality as the ideals of s 1 become the force of law that actually gives
substance and value to the right-granting sections of the Bill of Rights.
Already, we are indeed far from H L A Hart who argued that the social
fact of sovereign authority, and with it the accepted social fact of norms
that exist as law, is made possible by a presupposed agreement concerning
another socially existing fact of a rule of recognition appropriate to
identifying what is valid law.6 Those who attempt to argue that there is
and could be such a social fact as a rule of recognition, some form of
pre-legal secondary order norms of understanding, are missing the impact
of this revolution. Why should this be the case? Because the South
African Constitution is not grounded solely on shared norms but appeals
to an ideal community – Ackermann in Dodo7 actually figures that
community as the Kantian kingdom of ends – that not only legally
constitutes a new South Africa but also, like the kingdom of ends, points
to an ethical realm that has never existed and will certainly never exist in
some kind of final institutional form. At the same time, however, the
legalised ideals of the Constitution call South Africans to forsake the
shared norms that allowed apartheid to be institutionalised. The
Constitution, then, is emblematic of the very revolution that took place.
It is a revolution that gives life to the spirit of transformation – a spirit of
transformation of the realm of external freedom as it is legalised, but
never in a final sense, so that it remains grounded in the ideal of a
self-legislating community that is always aspirational and not merely a
social fact.
Ackermann often writes of how the fundamental wrongs committed
under apartheid constituted a complete denial of the dignity and freedom
of the majority of the population.8 These oppressed people were cruelly
reduced to a means in a system of racist and economic exploitation. But,
4 Ackermann (n 2) at 646.
5 Ibid.
6 See generally H L A Hart The Concept of Law 2 ed (1997).
7 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) para 38.
8 See, for instance, Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and
Others 1996 (2) SA 621 (CC) para 51.
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staying with the notion of Rechtsstaat as the moral realm of external
freedom, dignity of the person is what can potentially tie together the
two legislations in Kant (the external realm of freedom and the ideal
realm of self-legislation in the kingdom of ends) because it points us
toward the ideal of freedom in which human beings can actually seek to
harmonise their interest in an ethical community or nation state
committed to justice. The question of whether or not the two legislations
of external freedom and the uncoerced harmonisation of interest in the
kingdom of ends might be rooted in a shared principle of humanity in
Kant, is a much contested debate among Kantian scholars. But I want to
argue here for the significance of understanding the South African
Constitution as a Rechtsstaat that does indeed find a unified basis for these
two legislations in the constitutionalisation of the ideals of s 1 as the
right-granting force of the Bill of Rights.
This can help us understand why, even if the kingdom of ends must
remain an aspirational ideal, the principle of a free humanity is what lies as
the basis of the ‘we the people’ that inaugurates the preamble of the
Constitution. Thus, freedom understood as the possible self-legislation of
an ethical humanity committed to these aspirational ideals is at the heart
of this new Constitution because it is only such an ethical notion of
humanity that can feed the hope to move beyond the bloody and horrific
past – the heteronymous realm of deeply entrenched racist practices that
haunts us, and indeed ensnare us, in an unjust social reality.
The robust cultural panoply of the people of South Africa cannot be
adequately explained by terms like diversity or weak-kneed ideas of
multiculturalism. The centrality of freedom understood as the possibility
of harmonisation follows because only such a freed humanity can aspire
to a shared ethical practice of justice; and, it is fidelity to such practice that
can fuel the teleological, interpretative approach of the South African
Constitutional Court to a future that is always already further and further
away from the violence of the past. Dignity, with its integral connection
to freedom, may represent the richest western conception of an ethical
humanity that still heeds the call and the commitment to justice – both as
an ideal and a practice – in that law as the moral realm of external
freedom does not seek legitimacy in some outside principle whether it be
the rule of democratic legislatures, the social fact of presupposed
agreements on secondary norms, or even some ideal community of
dialogue. Freedom and dignity so understood is the Grundnorm of the
new South Africa, because such an ethical conception of humanity is the
only true hope to stave off the moral draining of law so that it is left with
nothing other than cynical realist interpretations of law as either arbitrary
balancing of interests, depending on who has more power, or some kind
of rationalised scheme of utility-maximizing actors who only agree to put
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down their guns because that is a necessary step toward greater
self-interest.
Of course, the notion of law rooted in an ethical conception of
humanity is not simply western. It also gives life to what Chuma
Himonga speaks of as a ‘living customary law’9 of South Africa with ideals
such as ubuntu that configure an extremely rich view of what it means to
be a human being in community with other human beings. It is precisely
this possibility that a law rooted in an ethical conception of humanity is
shared by the very different traditions of law and ethics in South Africa
that can give us hope that the fragility of any appeal to an ethical
community will not shatter, because it is fed by many sources. We can
now read Ackermann’s judgment in Ferreira v Levin10 and investigate why
the principle of humanity rooted in ethical freedom, even as constitu-
tionalised as the basis of the realm of external freedom, still always points
beyond any list of enumerated liberties.
III RESIDUAL RIGHT OF FREEDOM AND TELEOLOGICAL
ASPIRATION
In Ferreira, Justice Ackermann defended a residual right of freedom
through an interpretation of what was in the then interim Constitution
s 11(1)11 and in the 1996 Constitution became s 12(1), which states:
‘Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person’.
Ackermann famously interprets this section by disjoining freedom from
the wording that follows it regarding the security of the person. The case
involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of a Companies Act
provision,12 which compelled a person during winding-up proceedings
to testify and produce documents even if these documents and testimony
could be used against them (both directly and indirectly) in further
proceedings. Ackermann’s order, which is accepted by all of the members
of the Court (although for different reasons), is simple. The provision in
this matter can only be constitutionally valid if direct-use immunity is
read into it as a fundamental protection and judicial discretion is allowed
on the part of the judge as to whether indirect use would be allowed in a
specific case.13 Although I do not want to focus on Ackermann’s
reasoning in this regard, we can mention in passing his argument that
9 See for instance C Himonga & C Bosch ‘The application of African customary law under
the Constitution of South Africa: Problems solved or just beginning?’ (2000) 117 SALJ 306 at
319.
10 Supra (n 8).
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (‘interim Constitution’),
s 11(1): ‘Every person shall have the right to freedom and security of the person, which shall
include the right not to be detained without trial.’
12 Companies Act 61 of 1973, s 417.
13 Ferreira v Levin (n 8) para 153.
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s 25(3) of the interim Constitution, which in the 1996 Constitution
became s 35(3), both protects the right of an accused to a fair trial and in
subsec 1 protects against self-incrimination in such a way that it could not
apply in this case because no one in these proceedings had been arrested
and detained.14
Ackermann’s judgment in this case has implications for standing, and I
agree with O’Regan J and Chaskalson P that he wrongly curtailed the
reach of standing;15 however, in the final analysis Ackermann’s real
concern is to defend dignity as the grounding ideal, or Grundnorm, of the
Constitution. Certainly, Ackermann makes it very clear in his judgment
how important the right against self-incrimination is, both in South
Africa and in legal systems around the world. So, the judgment is in no
way meant to trivialise the right against self-incrimination or reduce it to
a rule of evidence. Chaskalson P explains that he would have resolved
this case on the basis of what was then s 25(3) in the Interim
Constitution, yet notes that Ackermann finds it necessary to construct an
argument out of s 11(1) ‘in order to give substance to the right to human
dignity’.16 Chaskalson P rightly interprets the jurisprudential spirit
behind Ackermann’s decision to disjoin freedom from security of the
person; indeed, the way in which Ackermann develops the argument in
his judgment substantiates the President’s insight into his ultimate
reasoning about the legal significance of the integral connection between
dignity and freedom in a Rechtsstaat rooted in an ethical conception of
humanity.
As Chaskalson P, rightly, reads Ackermann, the judgment in its largest
spirit wishes to philosophically deepen the meaning of dignity as a
Grundnorm of the Constitution and seeks to struggle with what this means
for constitutional interpretation; however, Ackermann is also moving
further away from a positivist sense of law, even if at times inconsistently,
because if freedom is irreducible to any enumerated set of liberties (as
Ackermann argues in this judgment17) then it is something that always
pulls the law beyond any of its current enumerations. In this sense,
freedom becomes a kind of transcendental aspiration that always
underscores the ethical and moral incompleteness of any legal system ever
fully to actualise justice, equality, and dignity. Ackermann, then, is
seeking to give depth both philosophically and constitutionally to dignity
as a foundational norm. But, in the course of so doing, Ackermann uses
semantic and philosophical resources that cannot fully express the
residual right of freedom as what is always beyond any enumerated set of
14 Ibid para 41.
15 Ibid paras 158, 163 and 226–30.
16 Ibid para 173.
17 Ibid paras 49–69.
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liberties. Ackermann’s judgment in Ferreira argues that this right to
freedom can only be limited with proper s 33(1), or what is now s 36,
justification; I want to suggest that this constitutional conclusion might
restrict legal regulation in the name of freedom and is the result of
Ackermann’s reliance in this case on Isaiah Berlin in stead of a more
Kantian inspired notion of freedom. Indeed, he seems to contradict
himself by relying on Berlin, suggesting ‘in the context of the
Constitution as a whole, there is [not] any difference between freedom
and liberty’.18
Berlin famously argued that freedom in the negative sense defines the
area in which a person is free to act without interference by other
persons. Positive freedom involves the examination of the source of
interference in addition to the values behind that interference.19
Ackermann is determined in Ferreira to distinguish between freedom and
the conditions of its exercise20 because he is worried, as so many others
have been, of ‘forcing people to be free’ and therefore undermining the
South African commitment to an open society. The key problem in
Ackermann’s definition is that he understands there to be a paradox of
unlimited freedom in the concept of negative liberty, which he seeks to
resolve constitutionally through s 33(1) of the provisional Constitution.
Thus, Ackermann believes he is following Berlin in that negative
freedom can be limited, both by the freedom of others and by other ideals
and values that are external to freedom. But Ackermann is in fact
recognizing that there can be an internal limitation to freedom even as he
recognises the external limit of other people’s freedom. It is not just that
freedom should be read generously, but that if it is to be read in a
teleological sense then we must realise that there is more to it than any
positive list of enumerated rights. By such a view freedom is not identical
to any enumerated list or even the concept of liberty.
Truly, Kant’s notion of negative and positive freedom is completely
different to that of Berlin. Negative freedom, for Kant, is the ability to
resist the imprisonment of immediate desires and impulses. Kant is often
accused of being prudish for suggesting we know ourselves to be free
when we know we are not doing what we want; however, this is not at
all the point Kant is trying to make. Instead, he is suggesting that human
life is purposive and that when we take our humanity seriously as a being
who can set ends for itself and can coordinate those ends as a direction for
a life, then we are able to exercise a kind of freedom precisely in
coordination with those ends so that we rationally guide who we seek to
18 Ibid para 52.
19 I Berlin ‘Two concepts of liberty’ in I Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (1969) at 121–22, as
quoted in Ferreira (n 8) para 52.
20 Ferreira (n 8) para 52.
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become. For Kant, humanity represents this ability of each and every one
of us to set and coordinate ends in the promotion of our end-making in
community with one another. Yet there is no implication that those ends
necessarily be moral ends. However, to be sure, humanity involves the
capacity to form ideas of what would constitute our well-being over
time. Let me offer a concrete example. An older male professor is drawn
to a younger female student because she has nice breasts. But, he loves his
wife and connects his overall wellbeing with fidelity and honesty to his
wife and, therefore, he forsakes the impulse to try and seduce his young
student. This is simply negative freedom in Kant. It is not acting without
interference; it is acting in accordance with a pragmatic notion of reason
that allows us to coordinate our ends for our own well-being. This
pragmatic aspect of our freedom in the negative sense is what Kant calls
prudence.21
But positive freedom in Kant is causality through norms. It is this
freedom that Kant associates with personality and upon which dignity is
ultimately based. For Kant, when we act as moral agents we lay down a
law for ourselves: a law that allows us to act at least as if we were free from
the constraints of the real world around us and had the power to
determine ourselves in accordance with what ‘ought to be’ and what we
‘ought to do’ in such a world. It is a normative law, not a natural law. By
acting under the law of the categorical imperative, which, depending on
how one counts, has three or four formulations, we can represent
ourselves as acting as if we were able to actualise the power to determine
ourselves in accordance with a law that we lay down to ourselves and
which, in a certain sense, brings with it the possibility of acting as
legislators with others in a kingdom of ends as we regulate ourselves in
accordance with this power of positive freedom.22
Again, it is important to note that every time we set ends for ourselves
and struggle to develop a life for ourselves – including a life in which we
project into the future who we seek to become – we are exercising a kind
of practical freedom, but it is primarily what Kant calls negative freedom.
Human beings, for Kant, have dignity precisely because we are the ones
who are able to exercise freedom both in a positive and a negative sense.
But it is through the positive sense of freedom in which we as rational
beings subject ourselves to a law of our own making and represent
ourselves as so doing that freedom confers dignity on all of us as persons.
21 Kant more clearly distinguishes between animality, personality, and humanity in I Kant
‘Religion within the bounds of mere reason’ in I Kant Cambridge Edition of the Writings of
Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology translated and edited by A W Wood & G di
Giovanni (2001) 39.
22 See the second part of I Kant ‘Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals’ in Kant (n 3) 37
for all of the formulations of the categorical imperative, which are ellipsed here in general
fashion.
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But, again, negative and positive freedom together means that we are the
ones who set value on the ends we make and that there is an ‘I’ who is
there as a necessary postulate of reason setting those ends. And this
ultimately leads us to respect the humanity and personality of others who
are like us as rational beings and who give value not only to their lives but
also bring value into the world we all share. Human beings are the ones
who give value to the world around them through the rational exercise
of freedom. This is why we have dignity and why we must regard others
as equal sources of value both in their own lives and as legislators in a
shared kingdom of ends. Through such an image we are ethically called
to treat ourselves and all others as an end toward the greatest end
represented in the figurative kingdom of ends where we all harmonise
the ends worthy of being able to represent the power of the ‘ought to be’
as the basis of action and a possible, just constitution.
Having explored Kant in greater detail against Berlin, we can return to
the tension between the two philosophical sources Ackermann uses to
defend a residual right of freedom integrally bound to teleological
aspirations toward ideality. As implied by the quotation from Kant used
by Ackermann,23 when we seek to coordinate, or harmonise, our ends as
legislators in the kingdom of ends, freedom is even more explicitly
limited by the very moral power that allows us to aspire to legislate
together on the level of the ideal toward a world worthy of humanity and
justice. When we degrade another human being, we fail to respect
ourselves and other people as rational beings, and in so doing we tie
ourselves up in knots of hierarchy that do indeed block us from
exercising our freedom for the endless struggle to bring a just world into
existence.
Under this understanding of freedom, white people were not free
under apartheid in South Africa – not just those white people who were
banned or curtailed because they sought to fight for the dignity and
humanity of the black majority, but also the white people who were
imprisoned by their own racist impulses and unable to evaluate such
impulses as they lay eaten up by anxiety to confront the very legislative
power that would set them free from the bonds of racism by coordinating
their own ends with respect for all other persons as ends in themselves. If
freedom itself is not just choice outside of interference, if it has in Kant a
critical edge and internal self-limit in both negative and positive forms,
then we can achieve what Ackermann aspires to: the protection of an
23 Ferreira (n 8) para 52: ‘Kant luminously conceptualizes freedom as the ‘‘only one innate
right’’ in the following terms: ‘‘Freedom (independence from the constraint of another’s will),
insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law,
is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his
humanity.’’[footnote omitted]’.
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un-enumerated residual right of freedom beyond any stated list of
liberties and, at the same time, be able to insist that such freedom is
internally limited by the freedom of all others. This coordination is not an
external limit suggesting that individuals need to make their freedom
work against limitation respective to other people, but it is internal to the
rational exercise of freedom which is what allows us to give value to the
world in which we live, both in our humanity and in the exercise of our
personality when we act and represent ourselves as so acting from the
standpoint of the ‘ought to be.’
Some of the dilemmas that, in Ferreira, worry Chaskalson P, O’Regan,
Sachs and Mokgoro JJ about Ackermann’s construction of s 12 (1) where
he disjoins freedom from security of the person, do not lie in his attempt
philosophically to justify a residual right of freedom that seeks fidelity to
the significance of dignity and freedom as the Grundnorm of the
Constitution; rather, the worry is that his philosophical defence would
lead to limitations affecting the ability of the government to regulate in
certain matters of the economy because the severity of the test that would
be placed on such regulations would demand them to be necessary and
not just reasonable. Chaskalson, P explicitly raises the spectre of Lochner v
New York,24 suggesting:
Implicit in the social welfare state is the acceptance of regulation and
redistribution in the public interest. If in the context of our Constitution
freedom is given the wide meaning that Ackermann, J suggests it should have,
the result might be to impede such policies. Whether or not there should be
regulation and redistribution is essentially a political question which falls
within the domain of the legislature and not the court. It is not for the courts
to approve or disapprove of such policies. What the courts must ensure is that
the implementation of any political decision to undertake such policies
conforms to the Constitution. It should not, however, require the legislature
to show that they are necessary if the Constitution does not specifically
require that this be done.25
To be fair, Ackermann J explicitly argues that the Lochner dilemma could
not even arise in South Africa because the Constitution contains
extensive protection of labour activities, and therefore labour legislation
could not be struck down, as in Lochner, as a violation of an employer’s
liberty to contract.26
What I have said so far raises a different concern than that suggested by
Chaskalson P, in that Ackermann is seeking jurisprudentially to do
something very difficult. Ackermann defends a residual right of freedom
24 198 US 45 (1905).
25 Ferreira (n 8) para 180.
26 Ibid para 65.
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that, as we saw in the opening quotation, always means that there is a
legal limit placed upon this residual right even if at the same time it serves
the Constitution as its Grundnorm. Simply put, the work of freedom is
never complete. Sachs J, in his concurring judgment, writes:
To equate freedom simply with autonomy or the right to be left alone does
not accord with the reality of life in a modern, industrialised society. Far from
violating freedom, the normal rules regulating human interaction and
securing the peace are preconditions for its enjoyment. Without traffic
regulation, it would be impossible to exercise freedom of movement in a
meaningful sense; absent government compulsion to pay taxes, the expendi-
ture necessary for elections to be held, for Parliament to pass legislation, or for
this court itself to uphold fundamental rights, would not be guaranteed. The
rechtsstaat, as I understand it, is not simply a state in which government is
regulated by law and forbidden to encroach on a constitutionally protected
private realm. It is one where government is required to establish a lawfully
regulated regime outside of itself in which people can go about their business,
develop their personalities and pursue individual and collective destinies with
a reasonable degree of confidence and security. I accordingly cannot accept
that the laws that guarantee my freedom – for example, my right to vote, or to
litigate, or to receive education – represent invasions of my freedom, simply
because they are subject to governmentally enforced rules and contain penal
clauses. We should ever be mindful of the fact that the review powers of this
Court are not concerned with maintaining good government, or correcting
governmental error, but with keeping government within constitutional
limits.27
As we have seen, autonomy and being left alone are not coincidental in
Kant. What Ackermann needs in his conception of a residual right of
freedom to avoid the paradox of unlimited freedom, is to continue to
move away from Anglo-empiricist notions of freedom. As Ackermann
strives to use Kant, he will understand that freedom is integrally bounded
by reason, which both provides a critical edge for us to judge an action as
free and allows us to understand how the aspirational ideal of the
kingdom of ends (and with it the harmonisation of our ends) may supply
an answer to the worry of Chaskalson P and Sachs J that Ackermann’s
definition of freedom is going to prove onerous to the redistributive
aspects that are also enshrined in the socio-economic rights that are
contained in the Bill of Rights. Notably, although O’Regan J disagrees
with Ackermann J’s notions about standing, she does not express any
view on the question of his interpretation of s 12(1). Understanding
freedom as integrally limited by the conditions of its exercise, the
seeming paradox of unlimited freedom can be resolved internally and we
27 Ibid para 250.
28 DIGNITY, FREEDOM AND THE POST-APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER
will see this is much more consistent with the slow move to Kant by
Ackermann over the remainder of his tenure on the Constitutional
Court.
To summarise, some of the tensions throughout Ackermann’s judg-
ment in Ferreira have led to confusions about the possible jurisprudence
that is indicated but certainly not fully worked out in that decision. For
the sake of clarity, I want to review the central propositions that will be
deepened and expanded upon in an explicitly Kantian manner in his later
decisions. First, Ackermann offers a strong interpretation of s 39(1).28
This strong interpretation is what Ackermann means as a teleological
interpretation of the Constitution, which always points to the Grundnorm
as the aspirational ideal that must inform all of the Court’s interpretation
of the enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights. There is, then, a central
connection between Ackermann’s teleological interpretation of the
Constitution (as it is both grounded by ideals but also aspires to regulate
South African society in accordance with the highest ideals) and his
defence of a residual right of freedom. Such a residual right of freedom is
one in which the positive law can never function as a self-contained
system, but always points beyond itself to the promises of the ideals both
grounding the Constitution and aspired to by the Constitution. Under
this reading of s 39(1)(a) and the teleological interpretation of the
Constitution that always points beyond itself by grounding itself
explicitly in moral commitments, the dignity jurisprudence has already
moved far beyond positivist conceptions of law and will therefore
demand a jurisprudence worthy of this Constitution committed to moral
and ethical transformation.
This interpretation also helps us to make jurisprudential sense of the
commitment to horizontality in which relations between individuals are
to be guided by these ideals which serve as an objective order of norms;
values and ideals that enact an ethical call for the transformation of all
South Africans in their day-to-day relationships long before any
individual comes to the Court to challenge their subjective interests.
Horizontality would be difficult to maintain under an Anglo-empiricist
notion of freedom because it would seem to demand far too much
interference in the lives of people; but, if we are to imagine ourselves in
the New South Africa as legislators in the kingdom of ends then his
two-fold interpretative contribution (the residual right of freedom and
teleological approach to the ideality of the Constitution) is why we have
a world where racism has no place in the social crevices of our day-to-day
28 Constitution s 39 (1): ‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign
law.’
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lives and it is up to us to transform ourselves as guided by these great
ideals which will never be fully realised, but always promise a better
world as we struggle to be worthy of this extraordinary Constitution.
IV THE CRITICAL EDGE OF DIGNITYAS MORAL IDEAL
Although Kant is often mischaracterised as an individualist, what is often
missed in his work is the profound influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
In the kingdom of ends, we not only legislate for ourselves what is the
right thing to do by rationally reflecting on the demands of the
categorical imperative, but also, as members and as legislators in the
kingdom of ends, we seek to harmonise our ends with one another so
that we can aspire to live up to the ideal of justice, even if as an ideal it
always remains beyond any actual existing legal system. Indeed, it is
through the appeal to the kingdom of ends and from the imagined ideal
standpoint of that kingdom that human beings have infinite worth
precisely because they are each viewed as a persona; being such a persona
allows them to subject themselves to moral, practical reason and aspire to
a world of justice which demands nothing less than that each one of us
tries to live up to the harmonisation of our ends with one another.
As suggested earlier, that is the moral justification for the legalisation of
horizontality in South Africa. In Dodo, Ackermann explicitly echoes the
language of Kant, arguing that: ‘Human beings are not commodities to
which a price can be attached; they are creatures with inherent and
infinite worth; they ought to be treated as ends in themselves, never
merely as means to an end.’29 In one of his earlier attempts at formulating
the relationship between the moral ideal of dignity, which as we have just
seen in his later decision explicitly echoes the language of Kant,
Ackermann defends dignity when it is used in the South African
Constitution as something analogous to what has been called neutral
principles in the constitutional law of the United States.30 But I want to
argue strongly here that the language of neutrality is not the one that
Ackermann purports in his most recent writing. Nor is it adequate to the
moral ideality that is ultimately the touchstone of the South African
Constitution. A neutral principle in Herbert Wechsler’s famous formula-
tion is one that must be neutral to the context of the case in the specific
sense that it provides a criterion of generality.31 The goal here was to
restrict open-ended assessments of morality and ethics by judges by
requiring them to have reference to general legal rules that could be
ascertained separately from the actual adjudication at hand.
29 Dodo (n 7) para 38.
30 L W H Ackermann ‘Equality and the South African Constitution: The role of dignity’
(2000) 60 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 537 at 554.
31 See H Wechsler ‘Toward neutral principles of constitutional law’ (1959) 73 Harvard LR 1.
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But, more fundamentally, as we have seen in the previous section, the
grounding of the moral ideal is precisely moral as Recht; therefore, these
moral ideals are converted into legal principles and this is what, on my
reading, inspired Ackermann to suggest that dignity could be the basis for
neutral principles. But ultimately these moral ideals that ground the
Constitution are ideals that can never be perfectly enumerated in any
actual legal system; thus, the South African Constitution holds a critical
edge, which at the same time demands that the legal system itself
endlessly aspires to realise those ideals. In summation, the desperate
search for neutral principles in the United States Constitution to counter
the many versions of legal realism that reduce law to politics was rooted
in a philosophical orientation which could not effectively imagine law as
an objective normative order of ideas and values that was above and
beyond the subjective clash of individual interest. Without such a
philosophical imagination it becomes nearly impossible for any jurispru-
dential work on the United States Constitution to even suggest that
moral ideals could both ground a legal system and endlessly point beyond
such grounding to the ideals that by their definition can regulate, but
never constitute, a legal system.
The critical edge offered by the transformative character of the South
African Constitution is not only away from the deep tragedies of the past
and toward the great regulative ideals, but it also points us toward a telos
of change; the spirit of such transformative change is what prompts
Ackermann to insist that there can be no final Constitution. Thus, the
teleological aspiration and generous interpretation of the ideals of
freedom found throughout the jurisprudence developed by Ackermann
is not only a matter of legal interpretation but is also a philosophical
statement that is integrally connected to the complex relationship
between moral ideals and enumerated rights. Exploring further the ways
Ackermann gives life to the legality of the South African Constitution,
particularly in terms of dignity, will help to demonstrate the evolution of
thinking in his jurisprudence.
Ackermann uses a number of constitutional provisions to underscore
his jurisprudence. First, he relies on s 1(a) which values ‘[h]uman dignity,
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms’.32 This provision is the touchstone, providing the foundation
of the Constitution. Second, Ackermann carefully reads s 10, which
states that: ‘Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected.’33 Similarly, Ackermann J argues in Dodo
in response to s 12(1)(e):
32 Constitution, s 1(a).
33 Constitution, s 10 .
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In the phrase ‘‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’’ the three adjectival concepts are
employed disjunctively and it follows that a limitation of the right occurs if a
punishment has any one of these three characteristics. This imports notions of
human dignity as was correctly recognised, although in another context, by
the High Court in this case. The human dignity of all persons is
independently recognised as both an attribute and a right in s 10 of the
Constitution, which proclaims that ‘‘[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the
right to have their dignity respected and protected.’’ It is also one of the
foundational values of the Constitution and is woven, in a variety of other
ways, into the fabric of our Bill of Rights. While it is not easy to distinguish
between the three concepts ‘‘cruel’’, ‘‘inhuman’’ and ‘‘degrading’’, the
impairment of human dignity, in some form and to some degree, must be
involved in all three. One should not lose sight of the fact that the right
relates, in part at least, to freedom.34
Thus, the right to respect the inherent dignity of a person is based on a
moral and ideal attribution of both personality and humanity. As we will
see later, Ackermann is closely following Kant in this argument in that
dignity is an ideal attribution to persons both in their humanity and
personality. What we need to underscore here, though, is that the right
recognises a moral ideal, which is not conceptually reducible to positive
right; indeed, the opposite is the case. We have the right because of the
ideal aspect of our humanity and personality.
We have already reviewed how Ackermann disjoins s 11(1) so as to
protect a residual right of freedom that both deepens the ideal associated
with a Kantian notion of ideality and personality, and prevents any
enumerated list of liberties to be reduced to the ideal of freedom. The
South African Constitution is not a codified system of law nor does it
have a general clause to be read through all of the provisions of the legal
system (such as in Germany). To this end, Ackermann following
O’Regan J in S v Makwanyane,35 interprets s 39(1)(a) as meaning that the
ideals listed in that section begin with human dignity, which is actually
meant to mould the interpretation of the Bill of Rights as explained in
our discussion of Dodo.
Ackermann is also well known for his careful review of international
law, which is demanded by s 39(1)(b), and he also takes into account
foreign law, which according to s 39(1)(c) may be considered. How does
he interpret the distinction between international law and foreign law
such that it relates back to the connection between the moral ideals of
dignity, equality, and freedom and the attempt to translate them into a
workable Bill of Rights? Again Ackermann finds allegiance with Kant, by
articulating the demand to consider international law as something
34 Dodo (n 7) para 35.
35 See the judgment of O’Regan J in S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 326–32.
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beyond the mere review of established treaties and rights; instead,
Ackermann J is also considering what Kant would call divinatory history in
which the establishment of these treaties and rights point toward a slow
progress of greater fidelity to the ideality of humanity.36 So, when
Ackermann J strongly interprets s 39(1)’s demand to consider interna-
tional law, he does so in such a way that it enacts the philosophical and
moral pursuit inherent within the Constitution of South Africa, which
demands aspiration to the slow achievement of a peaceful world by
coordinating its ends with the larger international community.
Here Ackermann J comes close to the great legal philosopher Hans
Kelsen who insisted that ultimately state sovereignty and the legal systems
of any nation state would have to be subordinate to an international law
system if their true meaning were to be given to the aspirational ideals
embodied in human rights.37 Correspondingly, for Kelsen, the ideal of
perpetual peace is the foundational ideal of all international law.38
Therefore, the appeal by Ackermann to international law is profoundly
principled and follows Kelsen in that the constitution of any nation state
must subordinate itself, in a sense, to the ideals embodied in international
law. It is not, by any viewpoint, a quirk for Ackermann to always review
international law; rather, it is integral to his jurisprudence and his
understanding of legality for the nation state. Putting this philosophical
and jurisprudential manoeuvre into a metaphoric context, we could say it
is fine for a nation state to build itself a house, but only if all nation states
start to pave roads to each others’ homes can we slowly begin to
coordinate the aspirational ideals of humanity in the form of an
international law that might yet one day evolve into a global city founded
on the ideality of perpetual peace.
Similarly, Ackermann uses the limitations clause of s 36(1) as another
provision which underscores the way in which the ideals of dignity,
equality, and freedom inform not only the interpretation of the actual Bill
of Rights but also the jurisprudence of limitation in which those same
rights can be expressed. Thus, what we have seen so far is that
Ackermann gives a careful reading to crucial clauses in the Constitution
to show how the ideals of dignity, freedom, and equality must inform the
way in which the law is always teleologically interpreted towards these
great regulative ideals. And, this ‘towards’, then, is integral to the
development of principles, which are further used to resolve actual
constitutional issues. The South African Constitution, then, as it has
36 See, for instance, I Kant ‘An old question raised again: Is the human race constantly
progressing?’ in I Kant Kant on History translated and edited by L W Beck (1963) 140.
37 See generally H Kelsen Pure Theory of Law translated from the second (revised and
enlarged) German edition by Max Knight (1967).
38 See H Kelsen Peace Through Law (1944).
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legally operationalised the moral significance of these great ideals is a
jurisprudence of principle, not a jurisprudence of rules. For example, a
principle of law is invoked when Ackermann disjoins the ideal attribution
of dignity from the right of dignity and shows the legal significance of
that disjoining.39 As Ackermann tells us, one crucial aspect of constitu-
tional interpretation is that it seeks to build a culture of justification and,
therefore, the often lengthy decisions are done with such care so as to
show exactly why the disjoining (and very specific reconnection) of the
ideal attribution of dignity from the right of dignity matters so that we
come to understand the legal significance of that right as a part of the slow
development of a coherent set of principles as the basis of constitutional
jurisprudence.40
V DISTINCTIONS OF EQUALITYAND A JURISPRUDENCE
OF HUMAN WORTH
Ackermann (and the Constitutional Court generally) has been criticised
as either ignoring equality or rendering equality so subordinate to dignity
and freedom that he is actually misreading the Constitution, which
always lists dignity, equality, and freedom in fair proportion.41 But, is this
a correct criticism of the dignity-based approach? Section 8(1) under the
interim Constitution and s 9(1) of the 1996 Constitution begin with the
important right to equality before the law and equal protection of the
law. It is important to note the distinction between the two forms,
because equality before the law and equal protection of the law do not
mean the same thing. Indeed, it is equality before the law that is further
defined in s 8(2) under the interim Constitution and s 9(2) of the 1996
Constitution, which explicitly state that equality must include ‘the full
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’. Further, the Constitu-
tion requires the pursuit of equality through legislative or other means to
promote and advance persons who have suffered disadvantage by unfair
discrimination. Section 8(3) of the interim Constitution and s 9(3) in the
1996 Constitution provide a list of enumerated, specific grounds on the
basis of which no person can be discriminated against; if a person can
establish discrimination based on such a ground, then it will be presumed
that there is unfair discrimination.
The Constitutional Court has also emphasised that the specifically
listed grounds in s 9(3) are by no means inclusive of all forms of unfair
39 Ackermann (n 2) at 647.
40 Ibid.
41 See generally, A Fagan ‘Dignity and unfair discrimination: A value misplaced and a right
misunderstood’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 220; C Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of
transformation: Difficulties in the development of an indigenous jurisprudence of equality’
(1998) 14 SAJHR 248; D Davis ‘Equality: The majesty of legoland jurisprudence’ (1999) 116
SALJ 398.
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discrimination.42 Ackermann explains such a list as a positive protection
of equality, which differs significantly from other jurisprudential orders
such as that of the United States. Justices Ackermann, O’Regan and
Sachs, writing in Prinsloo,43 suggest:
Proper weight must be given to the use of the word ‘discrimination’ in
subsection (2). The drafters of section 8 did not, for example, follow the
model of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States which, in paragraph 1 thereof, refers only to the denial of ‘the equal
protection of the laws.’ Section 8(1) certainly positively enacts the encompass-
ing and important right to ‘equality before the law and to equal protection of
the law’, but section 8 does not stop there. It goes further and in section 8(2)
proscribes ‘unfair discrimination’ in the two forms we have mentioned.44
How is one to determine, then, the constitutional reach of s 8(4) of the
interim Constitution or its equivalent in s 9(4) in the 1996 Constitution?
For the Court in Prinsloo, and following what we already argued about
the multi-layered constitutionalisation of dignity in the South African
Constitution, the unfair discrimination provisions in s 8(2) and (4) of the
interim Constitution read together (similarly in s 9(2) and (4) of the 1996
Constitution) emphasise that forms of discrimination which violate the
dignity of persons will be central to the interpretation of the constitu-
tional meaning behind the idea of positive protection of equality before
the law and, therefore, to what constitutes unfair discrimination. Again,
to quote Justices Ackermann, Sachs and O’Regan:
We are emerging from a period of our history during which the humanity of
the majority of the inhabitants of this country was denied. They were treated
as not having inherent worth; as objects whose identities could be arbitrarily
defined by those in power rather than as persons of infinite worth. In short,
they were denied recognition of their inherent dignity.45
Although an affront to dignity is seen as at the heart of what distinguishes
unfair discrimination from the inevitable differentiation between people
that must occur in any modern legal system, other forms of differentia-
tion which may adversely affect people are not excluded. In Prinsloo the
differentiation between owners and occupiers inside fire control areas
and those who own or occupy land outside those areas was not seen as
unfair discrimination, because, to quote the Court,
It is clearly a regulatory matter to be adjudged according to whether or not
there is a rational relationship between the differentiation enacted by s 84 and
42 See Prinsloo v Van der Linde and Another 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) paras 27 & 28, Harksen v
Lane NO and Others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 47.
43 Prinsloo ibid.
44 Ibid para 30.
45 Ibid para 31.
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the purpose sought to be achieved by the Act. We have decided that such a
relationship exists. Accordingly, no breach of s 8(1) or (2) has been
established.46
What is demanded if dignity is constitutionalised as central to the legal
meaning of s 8(2) and (4) of the interim Constitution (and s 9(2) and (4)
in the 1996 Constitution), is not that persons be treated equally as if
equality could be reduced to a mathematical formula suggesting what is
‘like’ should be treated ‘like’. Nor should such equality be viewed as a
rubber stamp of ‘same treatment’ if there is a real and significant
difference that must be recognised and respected in order to honour
dignity and equality. The key is that people must be treated as of equal
worth rather than treated equally in some simplistic sense; for, every
citizen of South Africa is to be treated alike under equal protection of the
law.
In a series of cases relating to the rights of gay and lesbian citizens of
South Africa, the Constitutional Court profoundly expanded the
meaning of respect for the dignity of persons and its relationship to other
enumerated rights in the Constitution such as equality and privacy. In
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of
Justice and Others,47 several statutory provisions that penalised the act of
sodomy between men as well as the common law crime of sodomy were
found invalid under ss 9, 10, and 14 of the 1996 Constitution. The
common law crime of sodomy was not before the Court because the
1996 Constitution does not require orders of constitutional invalidity of
common law by the Constitutional Court nor does it empower a referral
for such purpose.48 But, as Ackermann writes for the Court, it was
impossible to separate the statutory provisions from the common law
crime of sodomy and, therefore, even though it was not directly before
the Constitutional Court a finding of constitutional invalidity was argued
as indispensable to the statutory orders of constitutional validity ordered
by the High Court.49
Ackermann begins his analysis of what is in a deep way morally and
constitutionally wrong with both the statutory sodomy penalisation as
well as the common law criminal offense of sodomy. It was only sodomy
between men that was a crime in South Africa.50 The High Court found
in its own order of constitutional invalidity that both the statutory
penalisations and the common law offense of sodomy was unfair
discrimination on two grounds. First, it discriminated on the basis of sex
46 Ibid para 41.
47 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
48 Ibid para 2.
49 Ibid para 9.
50 Ibid para 11.
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and gender in that no equivalent act performed by heterosexual couples
or two women was criminalised. Second, the High Court concluded that
unfairness would be presumed under s 9(3) since sexual orientation is one
of the listed grounds protected against discrimination.51 Ackermann here
reiterates that neither the 1993 nor the 1996 Constitution is based on a
purely negative or formal notion of equality.52 Instead, what is called for
is a nuanced, multi-layered approach to s 9. After a careful description of
this nuanced constitutional interpretation of s 9, Ackermann continues
graphically to describe the horrific wrong to gay men by the criminalisa-
tion of sodomy. Ackermann reiterates this wrong in both philosophical
and moral terms by suggesting that ‘[t]he desire for equality is not a hope
for the elimination of all differences. . . . To understand ‘‘the other’’ one
must try, as far as is humanly possible, to place oneself in the position of
‘‘the other’’.’53
Gay men, then, are identified as a political minority who are
particularly vulnerable because of the stigma that has long been associated
with their sexuality in South Africa.54 This means that they have to
endure serious other consequences such as fears of entrapment and the
intimidation that comes with having a so-called stigmatised identity.
Since sexual orientation is a listed ground, the case is evaluated from the
standpoint of presumed unfair discrimination and Ackermann writes
frankly that there could be no legitimate purpose for this discrimina-
tion.55 We will return to such a possible legitimate purpose in his analysis
of the limitation clause because, at best, that purpose is a concession to
gross stereotypes of gay men or to religious beliefs that must not be used
to deny the dignity of other persons. Although Ackermann starts his
judgments from the standpoint of inequality, he then explains the wrong
that occurs to the dignity of gay men under s 10:
The common-law prohibition on sodomy criminalises all sexual intercourse
per anum between men: regardless of the relationship of the couple who
engage therein, of the age of such couple, of the place where it occurs, or
indeed of any other circumstances whatsoever. In so doing, it punishes a form
of sexual conduct which is identified by our broader society with homosexu-
als. Its symbolic effect is to state that in the eyes of our legal system all gay men
are criminals. The stigma thus attached to a significant proportion of our
population is manifest. But the harm imposed by the criminal law is far more
than symbolic. As a result of the criminal offence, gay men are at risk of arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the offence of sodomy simply because they
51 Ibid para 13.
52 Ibid para 16.
53 Ibid para 22.
54 Ibid para 25.
55 Ibid para 26.
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seek to engage in sexual conduct which is part of their experience of being
human. Just as apartheid legislation rendered the lives of couples of different
racial groups perpetually at risk, the sodomy offence builds insecurity and
vulnerability into the daily lives of gay men. There can be no doubt that the
existence of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression for gay men
degrades and devalues gay men in our broader society. As such it is a palpable
invasion of their dignity and a breach of section 10 of the Constitution.56
As we saw earlier, Ackermann reads the limitation clause through s 1 as
the basis for a proportionality analysis in that the limitation must be
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. Thus, the
proportionality which seems to call for a balancing of different interests
should be understood as more demanding than the mere balancing of
interests. Put most dramatically, if we take Ackermann at his word in
Dodo, and we should, proportionality demands nothing less than that we
analyze the possibility of the limitation of rights in accordance with the
great ideal of the kingdom of ends in which different interests are not
simply balanced off against each other but, instead, harmonised with the
ideal of dignity itself. It is precisely because of the central, foundational
importance of the constitutional establishment of the new South Africa as
based on human dignity, equality, and freedom that it is not only the
purpose of the limitation that must be considered but the relation
between the limitation and its purpose as well as a consideration of
whether or not there were less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.57
Many of the critics of the dignity jurisprudence have worried that
dignity in some way trumps equality and undermines the full-force of the
equality provision, and, of course, as a matter of enumerated rights,
dignity and equality can be separated. Sachs J nicely argues this point:
Contrary to the Centre’s argument, the violation of dignity and self-worth
under the equality provisions can be distinguished from a violation of dignity
under s 10 of the Bill of Rights. The former is based on the impact that the
measure has on a person because of membership of a historically vulnerable
group that is identified and subjected to disadvantage by virtue of certain
closely held personal characteristics of its members; it is the inequality of
treatment that leads to and is proved by the indignity. The violation of dignity
under s 10, on the other hand, contemplates a much wider range of situations.
It offers protection to persons in their multiple identities and capacities. This
could be to individuals being disrespectfully treated, such as somebody being
stopped at a roadblock. It also could be to members of groups subject to
systemic disadvantage, such as farm workers in certain areas, or prisoners in
certain prisons, such groups not being identified because of closely held
characteristics, but because of the situation they find themselves in. These
56 Ibid para 28.
57 Constitution s 36(1)(d) and (e).
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would be cases of indignity of treatment leading to inequality, rather than of
inequality relating to closely held group characteristics producing indignity.58
Indeed Sachs J continues in the same concurring judgment, suggesting:
The commonality that unites them all is the injury to dignity imposed upon
people as a consequence of their belonging to certain groups. Dignity in the
context of equality has to be understood in this light. The focus on dignity
results in emphasis being placed simultaneously on context, impact and the
point of view of the affected persons. Such focus is in fact the guarantor of
substantive as opposed to formal equality.59
The central point emphasised by Justice Sachs and Ackermann is that the
enumerated Bill of Rights must be read against the foundational
provision of chapter 1; but, this in no way undermines the specificity of
the right of equality and dignity even when both Ackermann J and Sachs
J argue that the enumerated rights can and should be read in terms of the
higher moral principles of the Constitution and in terms of the complex
identities that human beings develop over time so that categories and
classifications of identification are interactive, rather than abstracted from
one another.
Still, I think the critics that worry about substantive equality might be
answered more meaningfully if s 9(1) and (2), which includes the equal
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms, was interpreted as protecting what
Amartyah Sen calls ‘capability freedom’.60 This would give both
philosophical and constitutional weight to the first sentence of s 9(2),
which promises the full protection and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. This, read with the insistence that one not only deserves equal
protection but equal benefit, can constitutionally underscore capability
freedom. In short measure, capability freedom is affirmative in that
human beings must both have their fundamental human functioning
protected – the right, for instance, to food, medical care and work – and
be allowed the space to turn their dreams of capability into actual
functionings. Simply put, it is not enough to protect the right of
everyone to be a lawyer and enter law school if the education of the
country is unequal and racially or sexually discriminatory.
The space of capability freedom in which all persons could enjoy rights
and freedoms can then be understood as protection to the widest legal
extent possible for human beings to realise their potential capabilities and
turn them into actual functions. Again, someone who has the potential to
be a lawyer may well need to be supported to turn that capability into an
58 National Coalition v Minister of Justice (n 47) para 124.
59 Ibid para 126.
60 See generally A Sen Development as Freedom (2000).
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actual function. But, on another level we cannot function without food.
As Sen himself has argued, time and again, this emphasis on capability
freedom is philosophically consistent with a broad deontology such as
would be possible with an interpretation through the work of Kant or, as
Sen himself preferred, through John Rawls. However, I am arguing more
specifically that capability freedom fits the deeper meaning of s 9(1) and
(2) and is yet constituent with the constitutional interpretation that the
violation of dignity is at the heart of the equality jurisprudence. The
lifeblood flowing through such a heart is of course the transformative
jurisprudence of the Court that can one day constitutionalise capability
freedom.
Gay and lesbian marriage has now come to be protected as a
constitutional right in South Africa, making it one of the few states in the
world to recognise the full right to marriage.61 This recognition was
achieved by way of an explicit operationalisation of the connection
between the enumerated right to equality in s 9 and the right to dignity
in s 10. In Fourie, Sachs J emphasised that this connection demands a
reading of equality that affirms and celebrates difference:
Equality . . . does not imply a levelling or homogenisation of behaviour or
extolling one form as supreme, and another as inferior, but an acknowledge-
ment and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms that difference
should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. At best, it
celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society. The issue goes well
beyond assumptions of heterosexual exclusivity, a source of contention in the
present case. The acknowledgement and acceptance of difference is particu-
larly important in our country where for centuries group membership based
on supposed biological characteristics such as skin colour has been the express
basis of advantage and disadvantage. South Africans come in all shapes and
sizes. The development of an active rather than a purely formal sense of
enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting people
with all their differences, as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges the
variability of human beings (genetic and socio-cultural), affirms the right to be
different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation. Accordingly, what is at
stake is not simply a question of removing an injustice experienced by a
particular section of the community. At issue is a need to affirm the very
character of our society as one based on tolerance and mutual respect. The test
of tolerance is not how one finds space for people with whom, and practices
with which, one feels comfortable, but how one accommodates the
expression of what is discomfiting.62
61 See Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC), and the
Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.
62 Fourie (n 61) para 60.
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Under s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution,63 Sachs J made an order that, to
his mind, was just and equitable, which suspended the declaration of
invalidity to allow Parliament a year to correct the injustice in the
marriage law. We will return to O’Regan J’s concurrence64 in Fourie as it
relates to her own profound role in the development of the jurisprudence
of South Africa. For, indeed, the legalisation of dignity as the founding
ideal of the Constitution not only affects the interpretation of the
substantive enumerated rights, it also affects and explains the horizontal
application of the Constitution, as well as interpretations of the legal
significance of a division of powers between the judiciary, legislative, and
executive. In constitutionally ordering a remedy, as this remedy must be
faithful to the foundational role of dignity and with it the harmonisation
of interests and ends through the ideality of the kingdom of ends,
non-discrimination is not only central for those who are discriminated
against but for the protection and enhancement of the humanity of all
who live within the new South Africa. As Ackermann movingly writes:
The bell tolls for everyone, because ‘‘[t]he social cost of discrimination is
insupportably high and these insidious practices are damaging not only to the
individuals who suffer the discrimination, but also to the very fabric of our
society.’’ The most effective way of achieving this in the present case is by a
suitable reading in order, if this is reasonably possible.65
The bell tolls for everyone in the New South Africa because apartheid did
not just affect the humanity of the majority black population who
suffered worst under its brutality. Apartheid and its concomitant brutality
also significantly diminished the humanity of white South Africans.
Therefore, the moral demand to live up to the aspirational ideals of
dignity, freedom, and equality is the moral symphony we can all hear.
VI THE LEGACY CONTINUES
Justice O’Regan has captured the philosophical view of the relationship
between moral ideals, law and democracy that is echoed in every one of
Ackermann’s decisions. For instance, O’Regan J develops her own
judgment on the wrong of the death penalty as both against the right to
life and the right to dignity. What makes her discussion of the right to life
so important, though, is that she reads this right against the moral ideal of
63 This provides that: ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court (b)
may make any order that is just and equitable, including – (i) an order limiting the retrospective
effect of the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity
for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.’
64 Fourie (n 61) paras 163–73.
65 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and
Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 82.
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dignity; and it is this moral ideal which she uses to inform the
constitutional significance of the right to life. To quote O’Regan J:
The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the
rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than
existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without
dignity, human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be
dignity.66
We need to note here jurisprudentially that O’Regan is reading the right
to life through dignity as a touchstone ideal of the Constitution, not yet,
at this point in her decision, as also defending the legal proposition that
the death penalty is against the enumerated right of dignity. After the
right to life is read through the ideal of dignity, O’Regan does indeed
take that next step in her argument, suggesting that the death penalty
violates the right to the respect of dignity under s 10.67 As she notes, any
limitation under the limitation clause that infringes the right to dignity
must be shown to be reasonable, justifiable, and necessary, whereas a law
that limits the right to life need only to be shown to be reasonable and
justifiable.68 In conclusion, O’Regan holds against the death penalty as
both a fundamental violation of the right to life and dignity, and – given
its brutal abuse during apartheid – as running against the promise of a
moral future upon which the moral foundation of the constitution is both
grounded and the highest summit to which it aspires.69
Justice O’Regan further develops her jurisprudence in Dawood,70
which addresses the differential status of spouses where one has a
temporary immigration permit and the other is in a foreign country. The
case, of course, addresses the actual effect of this differentiation on the
lives of people without permits, as those spouses must remain outside the
country while they seek legal entry. But, it also echoes the two National
Coalition cases in the following sense. The right to form families and
intimate relationships is seen as an extraordinary value which must be
constitutionally respected. Although, as O’Regan J notes, there is no
express clause in the Constitution to protect family life, this canon should
be read into the right to dignity.71 And this, of course, echoes Ackermann
and Sachs JJ in the National Coalition cases. To quote O’Regan J:
Marriage and the family are social institutions of vital importance. Entering
into and sustaining a marriage is a matter of intense private significance to the
66 Makwanyane (n 35) para 327.
67 Ibid para 335.
68 Ibid para 338.
69 Ibid para 344.
70 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC).
71 Ibid paras 28 and 36.
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parties to that marriage for they make a promise to one another to establish
and maintain an intimate relationship for the rest of their lives which they
acknowledge obliges them to support one another, to live together and to be
faithful to one another. Such relationships are of profound significance to the
individuals concerned. But such relationships have more than personal
significance at least in part because human beings are social beings whose
humanity is expressed through their relationships with others. Entering into
marriage therefore is to enter into a relationship that has public significance as
well.72
O’Regan is sensitive to the recognition that not only are South African
families very diverse, but there are different legal regimes that actually
protect marriage – those under African customary, Islamic, and common
law.73 To recognise the importance of family and intimate ties in no way,
then, privileges certain forms of family or one legal regime of marriage
over another.74 In this case, O’Regan again underscores how dignity is
the moral ideal and legal touchstone of the entire Constitution. First, she
reviews chapter one – establishing the sovereign democratic state based
on dignity. Second, s 7(1), which introduces the Bill of Rights and which
is seen as the cornerstone of democracy in South Africa, is enshrined and
rooted in the ideal of dignity.75 O’Regan J concludes as follows:
The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be
doubted. The Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which
human dignity for black South Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. It
asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect for the
intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity therefore informs
constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value
that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights. This Court
has already acknowledged the importance of the constitutional value of
dignity in interpreting rights such as the right to equality, the right not to be
punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, and the right to life. Human
dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central significance in the
limitations analysis.76
As in Makwanyane, O’Regan then continues her argument that the right
to have dignity respected is itself an enumerated right and can be directly
violated; and, indeed, in this case, when there is no established right to
family and intimate ties, it is the right to dignity that is directly violated.77
As O’Regan goes on to note, however, there will be times when the
72 Ibid para 30.
73 Ibid para 32.
74 Ibid para 31.
75 Ibid para 34.
76 Ibid para 35.
77 Ibid paras 36–37.
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value or ideal of dignity – and as I have argued elsewhere, dignity is more
precisely defended as an ideal and not a value78 – is violated. It may be
found to be constitutionally breached as a more specific right, say for
example in the right to bodily integrity, the right to equality, or, to use
another of O’Regan J’s examples, the right to not be subjected to slavery,
servitude, or forced labour.79
We need to summarise now what is exactly constituted by this
jurisprudence, because it is so deeply misunderstood. First, dignity as a
moral ideal is constitutionalised in chapter 1 and ss 7, 36, and 39. Second,
dignity is itself an enumerated right and, indeed, the wording of that right
as interpreted by Ackermann J – rightly to my mind – turns on the
re-inscription of dignity as an ideal attribute of a person, and it is that
ideal attribute that must be respected. Third, the ideal character or value
of dignity when it is violated may also take the form of a more specific
breach of another enumerated right, as the violation of dignity as an ideal
then informs the breach of some of the most fundamental constitutional
rights in the Bill of Rights of South Africa. The central point to be made
is that the moral ideal informs the reading and interpretation of s 10 as
well as the other specific rights that O’Regan lists as examples in Dawood.
The symbolic, objective order of the Constitution, which makes certain
activities both illegal and constitutionally unviable, does so long before
there is any actual adjudication to invalidate particular legislation. The
recognition that sometimes a significant wrong to persons is allowed to
continue despite the Constitution means that the Court must exercise its
responsibility to deliver justice speedily. As O’Regan J remarks in her
dissent in Fourie, it is the duty of the Courts to ensure that the common
law is in conformity with the Constitution; and it is this duty that was
underscored in the Carmichele case.80 Thus, O’Regan J, while in full
agreement with Sachs J’s recognition of the right for gays and lesbians to
marry, disagrees with his suspension of the order of invalidity for a year
under s 172(1)(b). As O’Regan J argues:
In my view, this Court should develop the common-law rule as suggested by
the majority in the Supreme Court of Appeal, and at the same time read in
words to section 30 of the Act that would with immediate effect permit gays
and lesbians to be married by civil marriage officers (and such religious
marriage officers as consider such marriages not to fall outside the tenets of
their religion). Such an order would mean simply that there would be gay and
lesbian married couples at common law which marriages would have to be
regulated by any new marital regime the legislature chooses to adopt. I cannot
78 See D Cornell ‘A call for a nuanced constitutional jurisprudence: Ubuntu, dignity, and
reconciliation’ (2004) 19 SAPL 661.
79 Dawood (n 70) para 35.
80 Fourie (n 61) para 167.
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see that there would be any greater uncertainty or instability relating to the
status of gay and lesbian couples than in relation to heterosexual couples. The
fact that Parliament faces choices does not, in this case, seem to me to be
sufficient for this Court to refuse to develop the common law and, in an
ancillary order, to remedy a statutory provision, reliant on the common law
definition, which is also unconstitutional.81
Thus, it has been unjust for gays and lesbians to be denied the right of
marriage from the time of the passage of the 1996 Constitution.
O’Regan’s preferred remedy is consistent with her and Ackermann’s
dignity jurisprudence in which the delivery of justice that has been too
long delayed must be done immediately as a matter of principle.
We are returned, then, to O’Regan J’s telling paragraph in Makwan-
yane where she argues that dignity demands democracy,82 and, as I have
further elaborated, morally mandates Parliament to certain actions. In a
deep sense, then, the Constitutional Court cannot wait for Parliament to
catch up with what it should have done years before, because the dignity
of gay and lesbian citizens is being violated and has been violated, and in
the name of that dignity there must be a legal remedy now. Thus,
ultimately the dignity jurisprudence that has been developed by
Ackermann and O’Regan JJ has implications for the way in which all of
the political powers of the constitutional government must be organised.
This point is so often misunderstood. If democracy is a moral demand,
and not simply an imperfect political structure, then there is nothing
anti-democratic about the Constitutional Court recognizing and pro-
tecting, as an institutional matter, the moral ideals upon which
democracy rests. We need to note here that O’Regan J did not take a
position in Ferreira regarding whether or not Ackermann J correctly read
s 12(1). But, I believe that her position, which is so clearly shared with
Ackermann J regarding the constitutionalisation of the moral ideal of
dignity, would lead her ultimately to see the importance of protecting a
notion of freedom that is always beyond any constitutional definition of
liberty, because it is this freedom which ultimately points beyond any
legal system to the great ideal of humanity in which human beings, as a
matter of dignity, actually can struggle to live up to justice and
collectively seek to harmonise their own ends against the great ideal of
the kingdom of ends.
Returning to the quotation from Ackermann beginning this essay, the
Constitution is indeed transformative, spanning across a great chasm
separating the horrific past from the aspirational possibilities of a moral
future. But, by what traditions we orient ourselves as we try to navigate a
81 Ibid para 169.
82 Makwanyane (n 35) para 330.
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way over that bridge, is certainly open for debate. We need not be
Kantians; indeed, no law could demand that only one philosophy be
institutionalised in a pluralistic, open democracy. Although Kant clearly
inspired Ackermann, his legacy – as developed by O’Regan – has now
created a constitutional jurisprudence in which this ideal has taken on an
independent meaning as it is read through specific clauses of the actual
Constitution. It would, of course, go against the moral mandate of this
Constitution to rest it solely on even the best ideals of European
philosophy. For this is an African Constitution in which indigenous
values and ideals are explicitly valued and respected as a matter of right.
Great South African ideals like ubuntu, then, could easily be – and have
been – deployed to defend the moral ideal of dignity as it has become
constitutionally developed as the touchstone of the New South Africa.
Yet the aspirational ideal of the kingdom of ends, even if it is but one
configuration of humanity finding its way back to justice, still under-
scores the fragility of the new South Africa. For, ultimately, it will be up
to all of us who have the privilege of serving this Constitution to live up
to its moral ideals by pulling ourselves up and taking the necessary first,
second, and perhaps endless steps in the stride to the other side of the
bridge. But, for this author, the dignity jurisprudence as developed in the
South African Constitutional Court is what Kant would have called a
divinatory sign, a most meaningful sign, that justice is still possible.
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